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Abstract
Background: With the emergence of influenza H1N1v the world is facing its first 21st century global pandemic.
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and avian influenza H5N1 prompted development of pandemic
preparedness plans. National systems of public health law are essential for public health stewardship and for the
implementation of public health policy[1]. International coherence will contribute to effective regional and global
responses. However little research has been undertaken on how law works as a tool for disease control in Europe.
With co-funding from the European Union, we investigated the extent to which laws across Europe support or
constrain pandemic preparedness planning, and whether national differences are likely to constrain control efforts.
Methods: We undertook a survey of national public health laws across 32 European states using a questionnaire
designed around a disease scenario based on pandemic influenza. Questionnaire results were reviewed in
workshops, analysing how differences between national laws might support or hinder regional responses to
pandemic influenza. Respondents examined the impact of national laws on the movements of information, goods,
services and people across borders in a time of pandemic, the capacity for surveillance, case detection, case
management and community control, the deployment of strategies of prevention, containment, mitigation and
recovery and the identification of commonalities and disconnects across states.
Results: Results of this study show differences across Europe in the extent to which national pandemic policy and
pandemic plans have been integrated with public health laws. We found significant differences in legislation and
in the legitimacy of strategic plans. States differ in the range and the nature of intervention measures authorized
by law, the extent to which borders could be closed to movement of persons and goods during a pandemic, and
access to healthcare of non-resident persons. Some states propose use of emergency powers that might
potentially override human rights protections while other states propose to limit interventions to those authorized
by public health laws.
Conclusion: These differences could create problems for European strategies if an evolving influenza pandemic
results in more serious public health challenges or, indeed, if a novel disease other than influenza emerges with
pandemic potential. There is insufficient understanding across Europe of the role and importance of law in
pandemic planning. States need to build capacity in public health law to support disease prevention and control
policies. Our research suggests that states would welcome further guidance from the EU on management of a
pandemic, and guidance to assist in greater commonality of legal approaches across states.
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Background
Emerging infectious diseases pose global challenges to
human health protection. SARS and the emergence of
avian influenza H5N1 galvanized political and public
health communities to strengthen international, national
and local preparedness and response capacities, and the
emergence of H1N1 influenza has tested those
responses. The International Health Regulations 2005
(IHR) represent an important international commitment
to strengthening global capacity and acknowledge that
law is part of the public health armamentarium under-
pinning cooperative national and international responses
[2]. Whilst global disease surveillance capacity, in parti-
cular, has been considerably strengthened through the
IHR, management of disease outbreaks, including pan-
demics, remains grounded in notions of national sover-
eignty. The same can be noted with regard to European
co-operation, where regulations concerning surveillance
and early warning are drafted with full respect for
domestic law[3-6]. Harmonization of public health laws
is not considered to be within the competence of the
EU[7]. National systems of public health law are essen-
tial for influenza pandemic control, and international
coherence will contribute to effective regional and global
responses[1].
We report here results from a three year study analys-
ing whether public health laws across the European
Union, Croatia, Turkey, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Nor-
way are ‘fit for purpose’, whether they are coherent with
states’ strategic national preparedness plans, ways in
which laws differ and whether these differences are
likely to be important from a public health perspective.
Methods
Participant states
The research focus was all European Union countries
and the neighbouring countries of Croatia, Turkey, Ice-
land, Liechtenstein and Norway.
Scoping exercise
A scoping exercise identified thematic issues. We con-
ducted a literature review including reports from pan-
demic influenza simulation exercises, national strategic
and operational plans[8,9], regional preparedness docu-
ments and research publications on public health law in
Europe. The review was limited to documents in French
and English that were available in the public domain
between 2003 and 2007. With support from a panel of
public health and legal experts key intervention themes
were identified that were linked to World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) phases (table 1)[10].
Data collection
Data collection was two staged:
Survey
In consultation with public health and legal experts and
WHO, a self-administered questionnaire was developed,
piloted and finalised. The questionnaire addressed the
temporal phases and public health interventions that were
identified through the scoping exercise. It consisted of 114
open-ended and closed-ended questions that were framed
around an emergent influenza pandemic scenario (see
additional file 1). Respondents from each country with
legal and public health expertise were identified through
WHO, ministries of public health, screening of pertinent
publications, and through the European Public Health
Law Network website developed within the project to
facilitate communication between experts with an interest
in public health law http://www.ephln.org. Questionnaires
were sent by email with follow up reminders to ensure a
high response rate. On receipt of the completed question-
naires, and where state pandemic plans were available in
English or French, we compared the questionnaire results
of each state with measures proposed in the pandemic
preparedness plan of that state.
2. Review
Identification of country experts Participants with
expertise in law and public health were identified through
the membership base of the project network, European Pub-
lic Health Law Network http://www.ephln.org. In addition,
participants were identified through contact with ministries
of health, academic institutions, professional networks,
announcements at conferences, and searching journals to
identify authors with relevant expertise. The persons who
completed the questionnaire were in all cases except one,
the persons who attended the review workshops.
Workshops Four workshops were held (London, Tou-
louse, Prague and Lisbon), with a participant from each
state attending one workshop. Building upon information
provided through the questionnaires, we explored how
national state laws might assist or constrain public health
interventions in the context of the influenza pandemic sce-
narios previously described through the survey instrument
and also, with the emergence and global spread of H1N1v
in early 2009, how contemporary national responses were
impacted by current national laws. Respondents then ana-
lysed how differences between national legal systems and
between specific laws might support or hinder regional
responses to pandemic influenza, and the impact of
national laws in the following areas:
• the movements of information, goods, services and
people across borders in a time of pandemic;
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• the capacity for surveillance, case detection, case
management and community control;
• the deployment of strategies of prevention, con-
tainment, mitigation and recovery;
• the identification of commonalities and disconnects
across states.
Workshops were conducted under ‘Chatham House
rules’ to encourage openness and the sharing of infor-
mation between speakers whilst preserving anonymity in
the reporting of the results. Workshops were audio-
recorded and transcripts were subsequently sent back to
participants for verification.
Analysis
As noted, we identified a priori emergent themes
through the scoping exercise. Data from questionnaires
and workshop reviews were organised according to the
analytical categories. We adopted a ‘framework’
approach to analysis[11], consisting of five intercon-
nected stages: familiarisation; identification of a thematic
framework; indexing; charting and mapping; and
interpretation.
Ethics approval
Not required.
Results
1. Questionnaire results
The questionnaire was completed by participants from
23 states (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and
Turkey). All states have laws addressing the prevention
and control of communicable diseases. In nine states
there are also emergency powers provided in legislation
that include a pandemic in the definition of an emer-
gency, whilst fourteen states will limit interventions in a
pandemic to those provided for by public health laws.
Six of the Schengen states’ plans consider a pandemic to
constitute a serious threat to public policy or internal
security to justify reintroduction of internal border con-
trols. The Schengen Treaties (1985) on free traffic of
persons, since 1997 incorporated into EU Law, are
applicable in 26 countries, including the non-EU coun-
tries Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, but excluding the
UK, Ireland, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania.
Ten states have laws that would authorise border
closure in a pandemic.
Table 2 provides some examples of the range of mea-
sures provided across those states for which we have
completed questionnaire results:
The organizational structure of governments differs
across European states as a consequence of cultural fac-
tors and differences in legal system. Seven state rappor-
teurs in the project responded that their state operated
on the basis of a federal or quasi-federal system: Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. See Table 3.
In follow up research, the national pandemic plans of
the five federal or quasi federal states where plans were
available in English were analyzed, examining the distri-
bution of pandemic planning roles and responsibilities
between national and regional governments. See
Table 4.
2. Preliminary analysis of coherence between laws and
plans
We were able to undertake a preliminary analysis to
compare laws and plans in 11 states where plans were
available in English or French. In only two of these
states were all the measures proposed in plans sup-
ported by specific legal authorisation. In some states
Table 1 List of selected public health interventions linked to WHO pre-pandemic and pandemic phases
Pre-pandemic stage (Phases 4 and 5) Pandemic stage (Phase 6)
Screening and medical examination Obligation to provide healthcare
Isolation and quarantine Prioritisation of healthcare
Compensation Personal protective equipment
Vaccination and prophylaxis Distancing measures
Treatment and decontamination Closures, isolation and evacuation of facilities
Restrictions of contacts Restrictions of movements
Compulsory measures (within the country and in relation to persons in transit) Vaccines
Criminal offences Requisition of persons, premises and goods
Obligation to provide healthcare to persons in transit Other staff issues
Obligation of conveyance operators and airport authorities Burial of deceased persons
Border closure Prisons
Repatriation Communication
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such as Belgium and France, however, there are general
powers enabling any proportionate measure for a public
health purpose. In other states, such as Ireland, there is
a broad power to make regulations to prevent the
spread of infectious disease and to treat people suffering
from infectious disease that could authorise measures
such as compulsory examination and treatment. Exam-
ples of proposed pandemic measures not supported by
law included the use of unlicensed drugs, vaccines and
health workers, closure of borders, control of media
information and reporting, obligation of workers to
work where there was risk to health and safety,
compulsory isolation, quarantine, vaccination and priori-
tisation of people in access to vaccines and antivirals.
Plans of some states, for example Estonia, recognised
the need to ensure a legal framework for measures
while plans of most states made no mention of legal
underpinning.
3. Review
Twenty-four countries were represented at review work-
shops (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands,
Table 2 Examples of pandemic measures with legal underpinning
Measures Out of 23 states
Reporting duties in relation to communicable disease 23
Reporting duties specific to human influenza 15
Compulsory screening 13
Compulsory isolation 17*
Compulsory quarantine 12*
Compulsory vaccination 9
Compulsory treatment 17
Provision of healthcare to an EU national resident in their state 18
Provision of healthcare to a visitor from an EU member state 18
Provision of healthcare to a visitor from outside Europe 16
Requisition of persons 16
Authorise unlicensed staff to be requisitioned to perform medical acts in a pandemic 7
Obligation of a worker to work in a pandemic 7
Requisition of premises 16
Requisition of goods 14
Compensation authorised for requisition of premises 10
School closures 20
Prohibition of mass gatherings 20
*This figure includes those states that intend to use this measure for ‘listed’ diseases. Even where influenza is currently not in the ‘listed’ category, the process of
listing is simple and the intention is for the power to apply to pandemic influenza, once listed.
Table 3 Response to questions on devolution of powers
Questions Yes No
Do laws regulating public health
fall within the devolved powers of
regional governments?
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Portugal Bulgaria, Turkey, Croatia, Poland, Cyprus, Ireland,
Sweden, Estonia, Netherlands, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia
Does your country have
communicable disease legislation/
laws at national level?
Bulgaria, Germany, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Austria,
Cyprus, Finland, Malta, Ireland, Sweden, Belgium,
Estonia, France, Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia, Iceland,
Lithuania, Portugal, Norway, Latvia
Does your country have
communicable disease legislation/
laws at regional level?
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Iceland Bulgaria, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Cyprus, Malta,
Ireland, Sweden, Estonia, France, Netherlands,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Portugal, Lithuania,
Norway
Does your country have
communicable disease legislation/
laws at local level?
Germany, Austria, France, Iceland Bulgaria, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Cyprus, Malta,
Ireland, Sweden, Belgium, Estonia, Netherlands,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Portugal, Lithuania,
Norway
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Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, and
United Kingdom). Legal systems within Europe range
from common law states (England and Wales, Ireland,
Malta, Cyprus), to French style civil law states, German
style civil law states and Scandinavian legal systems, to for-
mer Soviet Union states and one state, Turkey, with some
influence from Islamic legal culture. These different legal
systems may result in different understanding of what con-
stitutes ‘law’[12], and this was explored in the workshop
discussion. Some states have laws, such as those in Eng-
land and Wales and in Estonia, that are detailed and pre-
scriptive. These laws tend to rely on lists of notifiable
diseases, and public health measures can only be underta-
ken in relation to listed diseases. In other states public
health laws are broadly framed allowing for the significant
exercise of discretion. In Cyprus there are no specific laws
governing measures such as quarantine but the Council of
Ministers has powers to take all necessary measures. New
laws in France allow the Minister of Health to take any
measures that are proportionate to protect the public
health.
Where laws give broad discretion to act, principles
such as those of proportionality or precaution are likely
to form part of the law. In Slovenia the principle of pro-
portionality has been written into the Constitution and
has since been developed by the Constitutional court.
The 2004/2005 Constitution in France incorporates the
precautionary principle. The new legislation of the
Netherlands is built upon the principle of precaution
requiring a risk assessment before measures are taken.
States are at different stages of development of com-
municable disease legislation. Some states are reliant on
nineteenth century laws that have undergone some
updating for IHR compliance. Other states have new
Table 4 Distribution of powers in federal or quasi federal states
Structure National Responsibility Regional
Responsibility
Summary
Austria 9 regions Planning and co-ordination
Situation monitoring
Assessment
Communication
Planning and co-
ordination
Situation monitoring
Assessment
Communication
Overall responsibility
for health care
Responsibility
increases in Phase 5
Regional involvement.
Mainly decentralised
Germany 16 regions Planning and co-ordination
Situation monitoring
Assessment
Communication
Pandemic
preparedness
Strategic action by
health system
Mainly centralised
Spain 17 autonomous regions or
communities and 2
autonomous cities
Planning and co-ordination
Situation monitoring
Assessment
Communication
Reducing the spread of diseases
Planning and co-
ordination
Situation monitoring
Assessment
Communication
Reducing the spread
of diseases
Responsibility
increases as of Phase
3
Close involvement of Regional
governments co-ordinated by National
government
Sweden 21 provinces
290 municipalities
Planning and co-ordination
Situation monitoring
Assessment
Communication
Reducing the spread of diseases
Guidance for health systems
Management of health system
Provision of a knowledge base
Planning and co-
ordination
Reducing the spread
of diseases
Contingency plans
Provision of health
care and medical
services
Distribution of
vaccine and antiviral
drugs
Mixed - response between National and
Regional
United
Kingdom*
4 regions Four national health systems with
a national Health Protection
Agency
Co-ordination and direction
Strategy and activation of plan
Delivery
Planning
Support of National
response
Mixed - response between National and
Regional
* The rapporteur representing the United Kingdom did not return the completed questionnaire, so questionnaire results do not include information on
devolution of powers in the UK. We did however include the UK in our own follow-up research.
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laws designed with pandemic diseases in mind. Some
states operate their public health laws at national level
while in others with devolved systems regional laws are
more important. In most states, laws relevant to pan-
demic influenza are contained in dedicated public health
laws, but in some states other legislation and case law
must also be included in the body of disease control
law. In some states (for example, Ireland and Belgium)
the Constitution limits measures that can be taken, pro-
viding greater opportunities for individuals to challenge
public health interventions. In all states the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is considered to
limit the measures that can be taken under public health
legislation, though not necessarily measures taken under
emergency powers legislation.
Across states there are differing approaches to the sta-
tus of pandemic preparedness plans. In Belgium and
Slovenia, pandemic preparedness plans have the force of
law in terms of both public perception and practice,
whereas in other states measures proposed in the plan
depend on legal underpinning. The relationship between
laws and pandemic plans was not clear in many states.
Comments by participants included, ‘the (survey) ques-
tions were difficult to answer because of the lack of
clarity between laws/decrees and the national prepared-
ness plan’; ‘the national preparedness plan was drafted
without legal implications in mind at first’; and ‘day to
day practice is not aligned with the legal framework’;
‘there is a gap between theory and practice. If there
were a challenge to an exercise of a power, the court is
likely to rule that it was up to the government to
decide...’; ‘There is a lack of clarity on competences and
responsibilities, and the relevant bodies in charge.’ In
some states it was considered that legislation was more
developed than the preparedness plan, and in others
that the plan was well defined but that underpinning
public health legislation was not sufficiently developed.
There are also differences in the extent to which
emergency powers can be drawn upon in a pandemic.
While emergency powers in France and Belgium apply
only to war, in Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania
emergency legislation specifically provides for commu-
nicable diseases and there are also emergency powers
provisions in the contagious diseases legislation. In the
Netherlands there is emergency powers legislation
applicable to a pandemic, in exceptional circumstances
and on a decision of the cabinet. In Estonia, two statutes
provide emergency powers. Both apply to a pandemic
and it is envisaged that they will be used. In the UK
civil contingency powers play a role in pandemic strat-
egy. The intention to use emergency powers is signifi-
cant in that emergency powers may allow for greater
intervention, with possible derogation from the Eur-
opean Convention on Human Rights[13].
4. Thematic coherence
Discussion in the workshops was facilitated in accor-
dance with the predetermined themes.
a. Movement of people, goods and information
There is no common approach across the states repre-
sented as to the control of movement of people. Some
states, such as Sweden and Ireland, envisage no restric-
tions. States such as Cyprus that are not signatories to
the Schengen Agreement have the option to close bor-
ders against travellers from within Europe, and other
states such as Slovenia and Estonia have emergency
powers applicable to pandemic disease which might
authorise border closures.
There are laws in some states to authorise restrictions
on movement of goods, mostly on incoming rather than
outgoing goods. Legislation in Malta and Cyprus allows
for the stopping of movement of goods in and out of
the country on public health grounds.
In relation to information, most states have incorporated
the EU legislation on Data Protection[14]. Some states,
Sweden for example, have passed laws to authorise the
provision of public health data to public health authorities
both within the state and to the EU and WHO.
b. Surveillance, case detection and management,
community control
In relation to surveillance of influenza, there are varia-
tions in duties of notification across states. Most states
have laws imposing on health professionals duties to
disclose to specified public health authorities informa-
tion on suspected or confirmed cases of disease. How-
ever in some states these laws may only come into play
where the disease is listed as notifiable (for example in
England and Wales, Ireland and Estonia).
There are differences in powers of compulsory screen-
ing and medical examination across states. While some
states’ laws authorise powers of compulsory treatment
and compulsory vaccination, these measures are prohib-
ited by laws in other states. In most states there is a
capacity for community control such as prohibition of
gatherings and school closures, specifically provided by
communicable disease or other legislation such as edu-
cation laws, or possibly at the discretion of a public
health authority or by means of exercise of emergency
powers.
There are differences in accessibility to healthcare
resources across European states, with some states pre-
pared to provide healthcare to non-citizens, such as
Lithuania, where undocumented immigrants have access
to free necessary healthcare. While some states, such as
Malta, intend to continue to allocate healthcare on clini-
cal grounds, where resources are limited states may use
emergency powers to control movements of goods and
people so as to prioritise state citizens in the allocation
of health benefits.
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c. The impact of laws on deployment of strategies of
prevention, containment, mitigation and recovery
Pandemic plans set out strategies of prevention, contain-
ment, mitigation and recovery but workshop partici-
pants noted an insufficient link between pandemic plans
and public health laws, potentially limiting the effective-
ness of those strategies. Interventions proposed in some
plans lack legal underpinning. Comments of workshop
participants included, ‘the preparedness plan mainly
addresses health services. What is lacking is a link with
the public authorities responsible for handling the pan-
demic’; ‘public health authorities responsible for hand-
ling an outbreak have little knowledge about their role
and how to prepare for it. There is confusion about who
is competent’; ‘there is a gap between the content of the
preparedness plan and their awareness of their responsi-
bilities’; ‘there is a gap in planning in relation to coordi-
nation. For example people are not clear on their role in
quarantine’; ‘it is not clear how to implement some
compulsory measures decreed by the Minister such as
mask wearing in public. How do we oblige people to
respect and comply with these measures?’ and ‘the infec-
tious disease legislation gives some powers to the Minis-
ter to enforce the regulations but this is not actually
done.’ It was noted in relation to one state where laws
gave powers to a public health authority: ‘but this is pre-
mised on the assumption that they know what to do. It
would be better if there were some directions/legal
framework’.
Even where plans and laws are in place, clarity is lack-
ing regarding which body is responsible for specific
interventions and as to the organisation and manage-
ment of pandemic planning. It was commented in the
workshops that ‘preparedness plans seem to assume that
powers already exist’, and ‘it seems to have been
assumed that the IHR 2005 would have direct effect,
like a treaty. Some officials think the IHR 2005 are suffi-
cient on their own to be considered as law, which is
obviously not the case.’ Several participants identified
problems arising from a lack of expertise in public
health law in their state, inhibiting implementation of
pandemic planning. The lack of public health law exper-
tise was even more significant in states where public
health powers were not detailed in legislation. It was
agreed by workshop participants that there is a need for
education, training and research on the role of law in
public health in Europe. One workshop participant com-
mented, ‘There is a definite need for public health law
training for medical personnel and there are not enough
courses available’, and another, ‘Health professionals do
not have a sufficient understanding of how government
departments such as the Ministry of Health are orga-
nised.’ Other comments included, ‘There is a need for
more public health law expertise, as this issue is not
well addressed within Europe’; ‘There is little training in
public health law. Law faculties and medical faculties
keep very separate’; and ‘Public health practitioners are
not aware of public health laws.’
d. Commonalities and disconnects across states
Disease notification duties were generally common
across states. Although not all states specifically required
notification of influenza, there were powers to make
influenza notifiable. Commonality in notification duties
is not surprising, despite the differing systems of disease
notification across states, as the IHR along with WHO
and EU surveillance systems require harmonised report-
ing of pandemic disease notification. There was some
commonality across states in powers of social distancing,
although again these were not always specified in laws
and in some states would require authorisation by a
political or public health authority. There was less com-
monality in relation to powers of compulsory screening,
examination, vaccination and treatment. While some
states’ laws authorise compulsory vaccination and treat-
ment, other states’ laws prevent vaccination or treat-
ment without consent. In Lithuania a person can only
be detained for the purposes of treatment, with a focus
on individual benefit rather than public health, while in
other states, such as England and Wales, a person can
be detained but cannot be compulsorily treated. There
were also differences in access to healthcare and in the
obligation of healthcare workers to work in a pandemic.
Project participants were concerned by the conse-
quences of these differences for the movement of
persons across Europe.
A majority of participants suggested a need for greater
guidance in the management of a disease pandemic. It
was commented that ‘a European response would be
much more practical and easier, rather than states mak-
ing their own decisions’; ‘it would be good to have uni-
form guidelines to avoid medical tourism, for example’,
and ‘if you have designated points of entry under the
WHO, it would be helpful to have EU advice and com-
monality on the understanding of what is a designated
point of entry. If people are coming from outside the
EU and then moving around within the EU, it would
help to have some commonality of rules’. One partici-
pant noted, ‘there are economic considerations. Indivi-
dual states are reluctant to be the first to take measures
such as contact tracing, for economic reasons. It would
be better if states decided together’. Others noted, ‘-It
would be better to have laws harmonised across Europe.
There ought to be better co-ordination of plans, how-
ever, countries should not be forced to follow others’
plans’; and ‘Politically the EU is trying not to be too
interventionist. But we do need some coordination as
there are no border controls. We also need coordination
on issues of distribution of resources across Europe’;
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‘The EU should keep states posted on changes in the
legal environment’; and ‘There is a need for coordina-
tion and guidance from the EU in terms of manage-
ment, but this may be difficult, thinking of refugees’.
But further EU involvement would not be useful for all
states: ‘We have no expertise in public health law. But
the public health specialists are knowledgeable on the
relevant law. As to EU involvement, WHO and ECDC
are more helpful... than the EU’.
Discussion
In a democratic system that recognises international and
European human rights conventions, interventions that
infringe liberties must be enshrined in law. While public
health policy and pandemic planning might propose
measures beneficial to the public health, those measures
cannot be applied without legal underpinning. The
results of this study show differences across European
states in the extent to which national pandemic policy
and pandemic plans have been integrated with public
health laws. There are differences in the legal status of
pandemic plans; in some states plans have for all practi-
cal purposes the status of law, and in others plans have
no legal authority.
A consequence of the disconnect between plans and
laws is lack of clarity as to the responsibility and compe-
tence of public health authorities. Only in two states
were lines of command thought to be clear, coordinated
and detailed. One role of law is to provide an inviolable
framework for policy and the application of powers.
Where pandemic plans have been prepared indepen-
dently, and in ignorance or neglectful, of law, and where
the legal framework has not been updated to reflect
plans, then confusion is inevitable. A common theme in
workshop discussions was the lack of clarity within states
and across states as to the authority responsible for the
management of different aspects of disease control.
Authorities in one state are not always clear which body
is their equivalent in other states, and whom to contact.
This is a particular problem in states where powers are
devolved to regional or local levels. For example in Swe-
den, where the system is decentralised and law places
responsibility at regional/local level, there are 21 regional
preparedness plans with their own responsible public
health bodies. Further work needs to be undertaken on
making clear pandemic responsibilities and competences.
This is an issue of concern, given the lead-in time we
have been given for a pandemic resulting from SARS and
avian influenza H5N1. It is hoped that the H1N1v pan-
demic, a pandemic associated with limited morbidity and
mortality, will provide an opportunity to establish
responsibilities and hierarchies in management.
While some states have passed new public health
legislation addressing contemporary understanding of
public health risks, many states have public health laws
that originate in the nineteenth century. In some cases
attempts have been made to amend laws in recognition
of IHR obligations and pandemic planning, without
addressing the outdated science and jurisprudence that
underlay old legislation, resulting in an inaccessible
collection of uncoordinated and unconsolidated laws.
Lack of public health legal expertise across Europe
compounds this inaccessibility. While rapporteurs
reported an intention by their states to make national
laws compliant with the IHR by 2012, there appears to
be insufficient understanding in many states of the
role of the IHR, of what is required in the way of com-
pliance in Annex 1 of the IHR and of the relationship
of the IHR to state plans and laws, despite guidance
on legislative compliance provided by the WHO[15].
Our results suggest that lack of understanding of laws
by persons working in public health has contributed to
lack of coherence between the IHR, plans and laws in
some states. As has been noted elsewhere[16] the IHR
(2005) like its predecessor regulations, relies on non-
binding recommendations and guidance (’soft law’)
rather than on legal obligations, such that compliance
by signatory states cannot be assured.
In some states laws that might be needed in a pan-
demic are not yet drafted, and the intention is to draft
these laws when they are needed. It is essential that
laws authorising public health powers be passed and dis-
seminated in advance of a pandemic and that reactive
laws are not drafted in times of crisis. In states where
public health law is broadly framed leaving much to the
discretion of public health authorities, and in states
where plans rely on the exercise of emergency powers,
hurriedly drafted laws might be difficult to challenge on
constitutional and human rights grounds.
Workshop discussion suggested that there is an argu-
ment for greater involvement of the European Union
in the management of pandemic disease, in the form
of recommendations and guidelines. Participants
argued for more input on disease management from
the EU. There was concern that with disparate laws,
states will respond differently in their preparedness to
carry out measures such as contact tracing or the pas-
sing on of information on travelers. There is also
discrepancy in healthcare resources across states within
Europe, and a lack of clarity on strategies to cope with
consequent movements of populations seeking care.
Different approaches to access to healthcare across
Europe might result in movement of populations.
Limitations of study
The project, scenario and questionnaire were designed
with H5N1 influenza in mind, and the first two work-
shops considered plans and laws on this basis. However
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by the time of the two final workshops, the H1N1 pan-
demic was well established, altering the focus of some
aspects of the discussion. For example in the second
two workshops, participants were concerned about the
feasibility of legal reporting obligations where disease
was so widespread, and possible conflict between
national laws on disease reporting and WHO advice.
The emergency of pandemic H1N1 halfway through the
study provided useful data on the practical application
of plans and laws and on amendments to plans and laws
necessitated by the experience of a pandemic. Discus-
sants in the final two workshops had the advantage of
assessing the application of plans and laws in that
context.
While some of the experts representing states were
government appointed or recommended, some were self-
selected. The appropriateness of these experts was veri-
fied by means of their publications and their professional
history. The challenge of finding experts is in itself an
important finding of the study, highlighting the need for
capacity development and coordination in this field.
Some workshop participants were trained in law, some
in public health and some in both. The differing language
of the disciplines of law and public health resulted in dif-
ferent interpretations of the questionnaire questions and
different understandings of some legal terminology.
We were unable to recruit participants from seven
states, primarily because we were unable to identify per-
sons with appropriate public health law expertise in
those states.
We were reliant on the expertise and knowledge of
the state rapporteurs for information on their states.
Where possible we cross checked responses but in many
instances this was not possible as laws and pandemic
plans were in languages in which we have no expertise.
The scope of the project focused on the extent to
which national laws supported or constrained the imple-
mentation of pandemic preparedness plans. It was not
an objective of the project to evaluate national public
health legislation against the International Health Regu-
lations (2005), although issues in relation to IHR com-
pliance emerged in workshop discussion. Such an
evaluation would be a worthwhile area of further
research.
Conclusions
There are significant differences in legislation and in the
legitimacy of conduct across states in Europe. In some
states pandemic plans are part of the law and in others
not. In some states disease measures are clearly specified
in advance, and in others measures are to be determined
where the need arises. States differ in the range and the
nature of intervention measures authorized by law, the
extent to which borders will be closed to movement of
persons and goods during a pandemic, and access to
healthcare of non-resident persons. Some states propose
use of emergency powers that might potentially override
human rights protections while other states propose to
limit interventions to those authorized by public health
laws. These differences could create a problem for
European strategies.
Differences across Europe in legal systems, in the
breadth in which public health law is framed, in the
level of discretion given to ministries and public health
authorities and the extent to which emergency powers
are to be used in a pandemic, mean that comparison
and evaluation of efficacy of laws across European states
is a difficult task. The results of our research suggest
that states would welcome further guidance from the
EU on management of a pandemic, and guidance to
assist in greater commonality of legal approaches across
states. There will be ramifications of incoherence of
laws across states for movement of populations, trans-
portation of drugs, access to healthcare and for human
rights and data protection. There is a need for further
analyses to determine the public health implications of
differences in laws, and whether regions beyond Europe
are more coherent in their legal responses to pandemic
influenza.
There is a dearth of expertise and training in public
health law across Europe. Most pandemic planning in
Europe is undertaken by public health practitioners with
no input from persons with expertise in law, and work-
shop results suggest that there is limited understanding
of the relationship between law and public health prac-
tice in the management of disease prevention and con-
trol. This suggests an urgent need for improved training
in public health law in both the law and healthcare
sectors.
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